Thursday, July 1, 2010

The Rebirth of Metaphysical Positivism

About 12 months ago I departed from Carnap in the following respect.

Carnap construed himself as putting forward proposals for languages and methods.
For example his definitions of analyticity were not intended as revelations of facts about the meaning of the word "analytic" but as pragmatically motivated proposals for its use.

Similarly to Carnap, I sought to articulate a particular formal analytic method, including the use of partiular methods and tools.
This I also construed as a proposal rather than any factual (or logical) claim.

However, this construal was not true to the facts. for my own pluralism meant that I had no expectation that anyone else would use the same methods.
There is a lot of historical accident in the detail, and even in the fundaments, of the methods which I employ.
I could describe these as examples of the kind of method which I encourage, but I would recommend that everyone look around and chose the particular languages, methods, and tools which are best suited for their work on their particular problems.

So I decided that I should not present myself as putting forward methodological proposals, and as being methodologically as well as linguistially pluralistic.
This lead me to attach importance to comparative methodology.
The idea is to replace advocacy of particular methods by comparisons between methods, making these as solid and objective as possible.

Metaphysical Positivism was the name which I then employed for the position in relation to analytic philosophy which I proposed.
It was not till about six months later that it occurred to me that I no longer had a position.
I had reverted to the search for and articulation of truths, albeit comparative rather than absolute truths.

I still had to make the same kind of choices (languages, methods, tools) in order to progress my work, but these were not proposals for anyone else, and insofar as I want to support their choice of methods, it would be by providing hard comparative facts rather than proposals and advocacy.

This now appears as a yin/yang type vanishing dichotomy.
Should I be stating facts or should I be making proposals?
Yes.

Anyway, thinking that I was not making a proposal, I for a while also thought that I had grown out of having a name for my philosophy, and "Metaphysical Positivism" was abandoned.
But now I see that its just a matter of level.
I do have proposals and I do wish to engage in advocacy, but the level at which this occurs is subject to occasional lifting.
Now, instead of advocating particular formal methods, I advocate comparative methodology.

So I may well stick with Metaphysical Positivism.

RBJ

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